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Is Google Making Us Stupid?
by Nicholas Carr
Feature article in Popular Mechanics Magazine, October
2008.
As we come to rely more and more on the Web’s immediacy
and vast storehouse of knowledge, we’re losing our willingness – and perhaps
our ability – to extract and absorb information from any other resource. Are
we evolving into intellectual surface skimmers?
So the supercomputer HAL pleads with the implacable
astronaut Dave Bowman in a famous and weirdly poignant scene towards the end
of Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey. Bowman, having nearly
been sent to a deep-space death by the malfunctioning machine, is calmly,
coldly disconnecting the memory circuits that control its artificial brain.
“Dave, my mind is going,” HAL says forlornly. “I can feel
it. I can feel it.” I can feel it too. Over the past few years I’ve had an
uncomfortable sense that someone, or something, has been tinkering with my
brain, remapping the neural circuitry, reprogramming the memory. My mind
isn’t going – so far as I can tell – but it’s changing. I’m not thinking the
way I used to think.
I can feel it most strongly when I’m reading. Immersing
myself in a book or a lengthy article used to be easy. My mind would get
caught up in the narrative or the turns of the argument, and I’d spend hours
strolling through long stretches of prose. That’s rarely the case anymore.
Now my concentration often starts to drift after two or three pages. I get
fidgety, lose the thread, begin looking for something else to do. I feel as
if I’m always dragging my wayward brain back to the text. The deep reading
that used to come naturally has become a struggle.
I think I know what’s going on. For more than a decade
now, I’ve been spending a lot of time online, searching and surfing and
sometimes adding to the great database if the Internet. The Web has been a
godsend to me as a writer. Research that once required days in the stacks or
periodical rooms of libraries can now be done in minutes. A few Google
searches, some quick clicks on hyperlinks, and I’ve got the telltale fact or
pithy quote I was after.
Even when I’m not working, I’m as likely as not to be
foraging in the Web’s info-thickets – reading and writing e-mails, scanning
headlines and blog posts, watching videos and listening to podcasts, or just
tripping from link to link. (Unlike footnotes, to which they’re sometimes
likened, hyperlinks don’t merely point to related works; they propel you
towards them).
For me, as for others, the Net is becoming a universal
medium, the conduit for most of the information that flows through my eyes
and ears and into my mind. The advantages to having immediate access to such
an incredibly rich store of information are many, and they’ve been widely
described and duly applauded. “The perfect recall of silicon memory,”
Wired’s Clive Thompson has written, “can be an enormous boon to
thinking.”
Surface skimmers
But that boon comes at a price. As the media theorist
Marshall McLuhan pointed out in the 1960s, media are not just passive
channels of information. They supply the stuff of thought, but they also
shape the process of thought. And what the Net seems to be doing is chipping
away my capacity for concentration and contemplation. My mind now expects to
take in information the way the Net distributes it: in a swiftly moving
stream of particles. Once I was a scuba diver in the sea of words. Now I zip
along the surface like a guy on a Jet Ski.
I’m not the only one. When I mention my troubles with
reading to friends and acquaintances – literary types, most of them – many
say they’re having similar experiences. The more they use the Web, the more
they have to fight to stay focussed on long pieces of writing. Some of the
bloggers I follow have also begun mentioning the phenomenon. Scott Karp, who
writes a blog about media, recently confessed that he has stopped reading
books altogether.
“I was a lit major in college, and used to be a voracious
book reader,” he wrote. “What happened?” He speculates on the answer: “What
if I do all my reading on the Web, not so much because the way I read has
changes, but because the way I think has changed?”
Bruce Friedman, who blogs regularly about the use of
computers in medicine, has also describe how the Internet has altered his
mental habits. “I now have almost totally lost the ability to read and
absorb a longish article on the Web or in print,” he wrote earlier this
year.
Friedman, a pathologist who has long been on the faculty
of the University of Michigan Medical School, elaborated on his comment in a
telephone conversation with me. His thinking, he said, has taken on a
“staccato” quality, reflecting the way he quickly scans short passages of
text from many sources online. “I can’t read War and Peace any more,”
he admitted. “I’ve lost the ability to do that. Even a blog post of more
than three or four paragraphs is too much to absorb. I skim it.”
Anecdotes alone don’t prove much. And we still await the
long-term neurological and psychological experiments that will provide a
definitive picture of how Internet use affects cognition. But a recently
published study of online research habits, conducted by scholars from
University College London, suggests that we may well be in the midst of a
sea change in the way we read and think.
As part of the five year research programme, the scholars
examined computer logs documenting the behaviour of visitors to two popular
research sites, one operated by the British Library and one by a UK
educational consortium, that provide access to journal articles, e-books,
and other sources of written information. They found that people using the
sites exhibited “a form of skimming activity,” hopping from one source to
another and rarely returning to any source they’d already visited.
They typically read no more than one or two pages of an
article or book before they would “bounce” on to another site. Sometimes
they’d save a long article, but there’s no evidence that they ever went back
and actually read it. The authors of the study report: “It is clear that
users are not reading online in the traditional sense; indeed, there are
signs that new forms of “reading” are emerging as users ‘power browse’
horizontally through titles, contents pages and abstracts, going for quick
wins. It almost seems that they go online to avoid reading in the
traditional sense.”
Thanks to the ubiquity of text on the Internet, not to
mention the popularity of text-messaging on cell phones, we may well be
reading more today than we did in the 1970s and 1980s, when television was
our medium of choice. But it’s a different kind of reading, and behind it
lies a different kind of thinking – perhaps even a new sense of the self.
Immediacy rules, okay?
“We are not only what we read,” says Maryanne Wolf, a
developmental psychologist at Tufts University and the author of Proust
and the Squid: The Story and Science of the Reading Brain. “We are how
we read.” Wolf worries that the style of reading promoted by the Net, a
style that puts “efficiency” and “immediacy” above all else, may be
weakening our capacity for the kind of deep reading that emerged when an
earlier technology, the printing press, made long and complex works of prose
commonplace.
When we read online, she says, we tend to become “mere
decoders of information.” Our ability to interpret text, to make the rich
mental connections that form when we read deeply and without distraction,
remains largely disengaged. Reading, explains Wolf, is not an instinctive
skill for human beings. It’s not etched into our genes the way speech is.
We have to teach our minds how to translate the symbolic
characters we see into the language we understand. And the media or other
technologies we use in learning and practising the craft of reading play an
important part in shaping the neural circuits inside our brains.
Experiments demonstrate that readers of ideograms, such
as Chinese, develop a mental circuitry for reading that is very different
from the circuitry found in those whose written language employs an
alphabet. The variations extend across many regions of the brain, including
those that govern such essential cognitive functions as memory and the
interpretation of visual and auditory stimuli. We can expect as well that
the circuits woven by our use of the Net will be different from those woven
by our reading of books and other printed works.
Some time in 1882, Friedrich Nietzsche bought a
typewriter – a Malling-Hansen Writing Ball, to be precise. His vision was
failing, and keeping his eyes focussed on a page had become exhausting and
painful, often bringing on crushing headaches. He had been forced to curtail
his writing, and he feared that he would soon have to give it up. The
typewriter rescued him, at least for a time. Once he had mastered
touch-typing, he was able to write with his eyes closed, using only the tips
of his fingers. Words could once again flow from his mind to the page.
But the machine had a subtler effect on his work. One of
Nietzsche’s friends, a composer, noticed a change in the style of his
writing. His already terse prose had become even tighter, more telegraphic.
“Perhaps you will through this instrument even take to a new idiom,” the
friend wrote in a letter, noting that in his own work, his “thoughts” in
music and language often depended on the quality of pen and paper.
“You are right,” Nietzsche replied, “our writing
equipment takes part in the forming of our thoughts.” Under the sway of the
machine, writes the German media scholar Friedrich A. Kittler, Nietzsche’s
prose “changed from arguments to aphorisms, from thoughts to puns, from
rhetoric to telegram style.”
The human brain is almost infinitely malleable. People
used to think that our mental meshwork, the dense connections formed among
the 100 billion or so neurons inside our skulls, was largely fixed by the
time we reached adulthood. But brain researchers have discovered that that’s
not the case.
James Olds, a professor of neuroscience who directs the
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study at George Mason University, says that
even the adult mind “is very plastic.” Nerve cells routinely break old
connections and form new ones. “The brain,” according to Olds, “has the
ability to reprogram itself on the fly, altering the way it functions.”
As we use what the sociologist Daniel Bell has called our
“intellectual technologies” – the tools that extend our mental rather than
our physical capacities – we inevitably begin to take on the qualities of
those technologies. The mechanical clock, which came into common use in the
14th century, provides a compelling example.
In Technics and Civilization, the historian and
cultural critic Lewis Mumford described how the clock “disassociated time
from human events and helped create the belief in an independent world of
mathematically measurable sequences.” The “abstract framework of divided
time” became “the point of reference for both action and thought.” The
clock’s methodical ticking helped bring into being the scientific mind and
the scientific man. But it also took something away.
As the late MIT computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum
observed in his 1976 book, Computer Power and Human Reason: From
Judgement to Calculation, the conception of the world that emerged from
the widespread use of timekeeping instruments “remains an impoverished
version of the older one, for it rests on a rejection of those direct
experiences that formed the basis for, and indeed constituted, the old
reality.” In deciding when to eat, to work, to sleep, to rise, we stopped
listening to our senses and started obeying the clock.
The process of adapting to new intellectual technologies
is reflected in the changing mataphors we use to explain ourselves. When the
mechanical clock arrived, people began thinking of their brains as operating
“like clockwork.” Today, in the age of software, we have come to think of
them as operating “like computers.” But the changes, neuroscience tells us,
go much deeper than metaphor. Thanks to our brain’s plasticity, the adaption
occurs also at a biological level.
Goodbye, intellect?
The internet promises to have particularly far-reaching
effects on cognition. In a paper published in 1936, the British
mathematician Alan Turing, proved that a digital computer, which at that
time existed only as a theoretical machine, could be programmed to perform
the function of any other information processing device. And that’s what
we’re seeing today. The Internet, an immeasurably powerful computing system,
is subsuming most of our other intellectual technologies. It’s becoming our
map and our clock, our printing press and our typewriter, our calculator and
our telephone, our radio and our TV.
When the Net absorbs a medium, that medium is re-created
in the Net’s image. It injects the medium’s content with hyperlinks,
blinking ads, and other digital gew-gaws, and it surrounds the content with
the content of all the other media it has absorbed. A new e-mail message,
for instance, may announce its arrival as we’re glancing over the latest
headlines at a newspaper’s site. The result is to scatter our attention and
diffuse our concentration.
The Net’s influence doesn’t end at the edges of a
computer screen, either. As people’s minds become attuned to the crazy quilt
of Internet media, traditional media have to adapt to the audience’s new
expectations. Television programs add text crawls and pop-up ads, and
magazines and newspapers shorten their articles, introduce capsule
summaries, and crowd their pages with easy-to-browse info-snippets.
When, in March this year, The New York Times
decided to devote the second and third pages of every edition to article
abstracts, its design director, Tom Bodkin, explained that the “shortcuts”
would give harried readers a quick “taste” of the day’s news, sparing them
the “less efficient” method of actually turning the pages and reading the
articles. Old media have little choice but to play by the new media rules.
Never has a communication system played so many roles in
our lives – or exerted such broad influence over our thoughts – as the
Internet does today. Yet, for all that’s been written about the Net, there’s
been little consideration of how, exactly, it’s reprogramming us. The Net’s
intellectual ethic remains obscure.
About the same time that Nietzsche started using his
typewriter, an earnest young man named Frererick Winslow Taylor carried a
stopwatch into the Midvale Steel plant in Philadelphia and began an historic
series of experiments aimed at improving the efficiency of the plant’s
machinists. With the approval of Midvale’s owners, he recruited a group of
factory hands, set them to work on various metalworking machines, and
recorded and timed their every movement as well as the operations of the
machines.
By breaking down every job into a sequence of small,
discrete steps and then testing different ways of performing each one,
Taylor created a set of precise instructions – an “algorithm”, we might say
today – for how each worker should work. Midvale’s employees grumbled about
the strict new regime, claiming that it turned them into little more than
automatons, but the factory’s productivity soared.
More than a hundred years after the invention of the
steam engine, the Industrial Revolution had at last found its philosophy and
philosopher. Taylor’s tight industrial choreography – his “system”, as he
liked to call it – was embraced by manufacturers throughout the country and,
in time, around the world.
Our boss, the system
Seeking maximum speed, maximum efficiency, and maximum
output, factory owners used time-and-motion studies to organise their work
and configure the jobs of their workers. The goal, as Taylor defined it in
his celebrated 1911 treatise, The Principles of Scientific Management,
was to identify and adopt, for every job, the “one best methods” of work and
thereby to effect “the gradual substitution of science fore rule of the
thumb throughout the mechanical arts.”
Once his system was applied to all acts of manual labour,
Taylor assured his followers, it would bring about a restructuring not only
of industry but of society, creating a utopia of perfect efficiency. “In the
past, the man has been first,” he declared; “in the future, the system must
be first.”
Taylor’s system is still very much with us; it remains
the ethic of industrial manufacturing. And now, thanks to the growing power
that computer engineers wield over our intellectual lives, Taylor’s ethic is
beginning to govern the realm of the mind as well. The Internet is a machine
designed for the efficient and automated collection, transmission and
manipulation of information, and its legions of programmers are intent on
finding the “one best method” – the perfect algorithm – to carry out every
mental movement of what we’ve come to describe as “knowledge work”.
Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, California – the
Googleplex – is the Internet’s high church, and the religion practised
inside its walls is Taylorism. Google, says its chief executive, Eric
Schmidt, is “a company that’s founded around the science of measurement,”
and it is striving to “systematise everything” it does.
Drawing on the terabytes of behavioural data it collects
through its search engine and other sites, it carries out thousands of
experiments a day, according to the Harvard Business Review, and it
uses the results to refine the algorithms that increasingly control how
people find information and extract meaning from it. What Taylor did for the
work of the hand, Google is doing for the work of the mind.
The company has declared that its mission is “to organise
the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.” It
seeks to develop “the perfect search engine”, which it defines as something
that “understands exactly what you mean and gives you back exactly what you
want”. In Google’s view, information is a kind of commodity, a utilitarian
resource that can be mined and processed with industrial efficiency. The
more pieces of information we can “access” and the faster we can extract
their gist, the more productive we become as thinkers.
Who’s a clever boy, then
Where does it end? Sergey Brin and Larry Page, the gifted
young men who founded Google while pursuing doctoral degrees in computer
science at Stanford, speak frequently of their desire to turn their search
engine into an artificial intelligence, a HAL-like machine that might be
connected directly to our brains. “The ultimate search engine is something
as smart as people – or smarter,” Page said in a speech a few years back.
“For us, working on search is a way to work on artificial intelligence,”
In a 2004 interview with Newsweek, Brin said:
“Certainly if you had all the world’s information directly attached to your
brain, or an artificial brain that was smarter than your brain, you’d be
better off.” Last year, Page told a convention of scientists that Google is
“really trying to build artificial intelligence and to do it on a large
scale.”
Such an ambition is a natural one, even an admirable one,
for a pair of math whizzies with vast quantities of cash at their disposal
and a small army of computer scientists in their employ. A fundamentally
scientific enterprise, Google is motivated by a desire to use technology, in
Eric Schmidt’s words, “to solve problems that have never been solved
before,” and artificial intelligence is the hardest problem out there. Why
wouldn’t Brin and Page want to be the ones to crack it?
Still, their easy assumption that we’d all “be better
off” if our brains were supplemented, or even replaced, by an artificial
intelligence is unsettling. It suggests a belief that intelligence is the
output of a mechanical process, a series of discrete steps that can be
isolated, measured and optimised. In Google’s world, the world we enter when
we go online, there’s little place for the fuzziness of contemplation.
Ambiguity is not an opening for insight, but a bug to be fixed. The human
brain is just an outdated computer that needs a faster processor and a
bigger hard drive.
The idea that our mind should operate as high-speed
data-processing machines is not only built into the workings of the
Internet, it is the network’s reigning business model as well. The faster we
surf across the Web – the more links we click and pages we view – the more
opportunities Google and other companies gain to collect information about
us and to feed us advertisements.
Most of the proprietors of the commercial Internet have a
financial stake in collecting the crumbs of data we leave behind as we flit
from link to link – the more crumbs, the better. The last thing there
companies want is to encourage leisurely reading or slow, concentrated
thought. It’s in their economic interest to drive us to distraction.
Maybe I’m just a worrywart. Just as there is a tendency
to glorify technological progress, there’s a countertendency to expect the
worst of every new tool or machine. In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates
bemoaned the development of writing. He feared that, as people came to rely
on the written word as a substitute for the knowledge they used to carry
inside their heads, they would, in the words of one of the dialogue’s
characters, “cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful.” And
because they would be able to “receive a quantity of information without
proper instruction”, they would “be thought very knowledgeable when they are
for the most part quite ignorant.” They would be “filled with the conceit of
wisdom instead of real wisdom.”
Socrates wasn’t wrong – the new technology did often have
the effects he feared – but he was short-sighted. He couldn’t foresee the
many ways that writing and reading would serve to spread information, spur
fresh ideas, and expand human knowledge (if not wisdom).
The arrival of Gutenberg’s printing press, in the 15th
century, set off another round of teeth-gnashing. The Italian humanist
Hieronimo Squarciafico worried that the easy availability of books would
lead to intellectual laziness, making men “less studious’ and weakening
their minds. Others argued that cheaply printed books and broadsheets would
undermine religious authority, demean the work of scholars and scribes, and
spread sedition and debauchery.
As New York University professor Clay Shirky notes, “Most
of the arguments made against the printing press were correct, even
prescient.” But, again, the doomsayers were unable to imagine the myriad
blessings that the printed word would deliver.
So, yes, you should be skeptical of my scepticism.
Perhaps those who dismiss critics of the Internet as Luddites or nostalgists
will be proved correct, and from out hyperactive, data-soaked minds will
spring a golden age of intellectual discovery and universal wisdom. Then
again, the Net isn’t the alphabet, and although it may replace the printing
press, it produces something altogether different. The kind of deep reading
that a sequence of printed pages promotes is valuable not just for the
knowledge we acquire from the author’s words but for the intellectual
vibrations those words set off within our own minds.
In the quiet spaces opened up by the sustained,
undistracted reading of a book, or by any other act of contemplation, for
that matter, we make our own associations and analogies, foster our own
ideas. Deep reading, as Maryanne Wolf argues, is indistinguishable from deep
thinking. If we lose those quiet spaces, or fill them up with “content”, we
will sacrifice something important not only in ourselves but in our culture.
In a recent essay, the playwright Richard Foreman
eloquently described what’s at stake: “I come from a tradition of Western
culture, in which the ideal (my ideal) was the complex, dense and
“cathedral-like” structure of the highly educated and articulate personality
– a man or woman who carried inside themselves a personally constructed and
unique version of the entire heritage of the West. But now I see within us
all (myself included) the replacement of complex inner density with a new
kind of self – evolving under the pressure of information overload and the
technology of the ‘instantly available’.”
As we are drained of our “inner repertory of dense
cultural inheritance,” Foreman concluded, we risk turning into what he calls
“pancake people” – spread wide and thin “as we connect with the vast network
of information accessed by the mere touch of a button.”
I’m haunted by that scene in 2001. What makes it
so poignant, and so weird, is the computer’s emotional response to the
disassembly of its mind: its despair as one circuit after another goes dark,
its childlike pleading with the astronaut – “I can feel it, I can feel it.
I’m afraid” – and its final reversion to what can only be called its state
of innocence.
HAL’s outpouring of feeling contrasts with the
emotionlessness that characterises the human figures in the film, who go
about their business with an almost robotic efficiency. Their thoughts and
actions feel scripted, as if they’re following the steps of an algorithm.
In the world of 2001, people have become so
machine-like that the most human character turns out to be a machine. That’s
the essence of Kubrick’s dark prophecy: as we come to rely on computers to
mediate our understanding of the world, it is our own intelligence that
flattens into artificial intelligence.
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