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Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev
1894 - 1971

The Soviet political leader Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev was a
major force in world politics in the post-Stalin period.
Nikita
Khrushchev was born in Kalinovka in southern Russia on April 17,
1894. At 15 he became an apprentice mechanic in Yuzovka, where
his father was working as a miner. When his apprenticeship
ended, he was employed as a machine repairman in coal mines and
coke plants of the region.
In 1918 Khrushchev joined the Communist party, and he enrolled
in the Red Army to fight in the civil war then in progress.
After nearly 3 years of service, he returned to Yuzovka and was
appointed assistant manager of a mine. Soon thereafter, he
entered the Donets Industrial Institute, from which he graduated
in 1925. He then took up his career as a full-time party
official, beginning as secretary of a district party committee
near Yuzovka.
Four years later Khrushchev attended the Industrial Academy in
Moscow for training in industrial administration, leaving in
1931 to become secretary of a district party committee in
Moscow. Within 4 years he became head of the party organization
of Moscow and its environs, thus joining the highest ranks of
party officialdom. In Moscow he used his industrial training as
he helped to supervise the construction of the city's subway
system.
When Stalin began purging the Communist party's leadership of
those he mistrusted, Khrushchev was fortunate to be one of the
trusted. In 1938, when most of the chief party leaders in the
Ukraine were purged, he was made first secretary of the
Ukrainian Communist party and at the same time was named to the
Politburo, the ruling body of the Soviet Communist party. As
first secretary, he was in fact, though not in name, the chief
executive of the Ukraine. Except for a short interval in 1947,
he retained his authority in that area until 1949.
During World War II, while still first secretary of the
Ukrainian Communist party, Khrushchev served in the Red Army
both in the Ukraine and in other southern parts of the former
U.S.S.R., finally advancing to the rank of lieutenant general.
In 1949 Khrushchev was summoned to Moscow to serve in the
party's Secretariat, directed by Stalin. Then, after Stalin's
death in 1953, Khrushchev was among the eight men in whose hands
power became concentrated. In the allocation of the various
spheres of power, the party was recognized as his sphere; within
a few months he became first secretary of the Central Committee
of the Soviet Communist party - that is, its chief official.
By installing his supporters in important party positions and
making some shrewd political alliances, Khrushchev gained
ascendancy over the seven who shared power with him; by 1955 he
was clearly the foremost political figure in the Soviet Union.
Even that prestigious status was enhanced 3 years later, when he
became chairman of the Council of Ministers, succeeding Nikolai
Bulganin. With that, he became the most powerful man in the
country: as chairman of the Council of Ministers, he was head of
the government; and, as first secretary of the Soviet Communist
party's Central Committee, he was head of the party.
Instead of emulating Stalin by becoming a dictator, Khrushchev
encouraged the policy of de-Stalinization, which the government
had been following since 1953, for the purpose of ending the
worst practices of the Stalin dictatorship. Although the Soviet
Union under Khrushchev continued to be a one-party totalitarian
state, its citizens enjoyed conditions more favourable than had
been possible under Stalin. The standard of living rose,
intellectual and artistic life became somewhat freer, and the
authority of the political police was reduced. In addition,
relations with the outside world were generally improved, and
Soviet prestige rose.
Khrushchev's fortunes eventually began to take a downward turn,
however. Some of his ambitious economic projects failed; his
handling of foreign affairs resulted in a number of setbacks;
and de-Stalinization produced discord in the Communist ranks of
other countries. These developments caused concern among party
leaders in the U.S.S.R., many of them already fearful that
Khrushchev might be planning to extend his power. In October
1964, while Khrushchev was away from Moscow, they united in an
effort whereby they managed to deprive him of his office and
require his retirement. He died on Sept. 11, 1971, in Moscow.
~~~<"((((((><~~~<"((((((><~~~<"((((((><~~~<"((((((><~~~<"((((((><~~~
Nikita Khrushchev rose from obscurity into Stalin's inner
circle, unexpectedly triumphed in the battle to succeed Stalin,
equally unexpectedly attacked Stalin and embarked on a program
of de-Stalinization, and was suddenly ousted from power after
his reforms in internal and foreign policy proved erratic and
ineffective.
Khrushchev was born in the poor southern Russian village of
Kalinovka, and his childhood there profoundly shaped his
character and his self-image. His parents dreamed of owning land
and a horse but achieved neither goal. His father, who later
worked in the mines of Yuzovka in the Donbas, was a failure in
the eyes of Khrushchev's mother, a strong-willed woman who
invested her hopes in her son.
In 1908 Khrushchev's family moved to Yuzovka. By 1914 he had
become a skilled, highly paid metalworker, had married an
educated woman from a fairly prosperous family, and dreamed of
becoming an engineer or industrial manager. Ironically, the
Russian Revolution "distracted" him into a political career that
culminated in supreme power in the Kremlin.
Between 1917 and 1929, Khrushchev's path led him from a minor
position on the periphery of the revolution to a role as an
up-and-coming apparatchik in the Ukrainian Communist party.
Along the way he served as a political commissar in the Red Army
during the Russian civil war, assistant director for political
affairs of a mine, party cell leader of a technical college in
whose adult education division he briefly continued his
education, party secretary of a district near Stalino (formerly
Yuzovka), and head of the Ukrainian Central Committee's
organization department.
In 1929 Khrushchev enrolled in the Stalin Industrial Academy in
Moscow. Over the next nine years his career rocketed upward:
party leader of the academy in 1930; party boss of two of
Moscow's leading boroughs in 1931; second secretary of the
Moscow city party organization itself in 1932; city party leader
in 1934; party chief of Moscow Province, additionally, in 1935;
candidate-member of the party Central Committee in 1934; and
party leader of Ukraine in 1938. He was powerful enough not only
to have superintended the rebuilding of Moscow, but to have been
complicit in the Great Terror that Stalin unleashed,
particularly in the Moscow purge of men who worked for
Khrushchev and of whose innocence he must have been convinced.
Between 1938 and 1941, Khrushchev was Stalin's viceroy in
Ukraine. During these years, he grew more independent of Stalin
while at the same time serving Stalin ever more effectively.
Even as he developed doubts about the purges, Khrushchev grew
more dedicated to the cause of socialism and proud of his own
service to it, particularly of conquering Western Ukrainian
lands and uniting them with the rest of Ukraine as part of
Stalin's 1939 deal with Hitler.
Khrushchev's role in World War II blended triumph and tragedy. A
political commissar on several key fronts, he was involved in,
although not primarily responsible for, great victories at
Stalin-grad and Kursk. But he also contributed to disastrous
defeats at Kiev and Kharkov by helping to convince Stalin that
the victories the dictator sought were possible when in fact
they proved not to be. After the war in Ukraine, where
Khrushchev remained until 1949, his record continued to be
contradictory: on the one hand, directing the rebuilding of the
Ukrainian economy, and attempting to pry aid out of the Kremlin
when Stalinist policies led to famine in 1946; on the other
hand, acting as the driving force in a brutal, bloody war
against the Ukrainian independence movement in Western Ukraine.
In 1949 Stalin called Khrushchev back to Moscow as a
counterweight to Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenti Beria in the
Kremlin. For the next four years, Khrushchev seemed the least
likely of Stalin's men to succeed him. Yet, when Stalin died on
March 5, 1953, Khrushchev moved quickly to do so. After leading
a conspiracy to oust Beria in June 1953, he demoted Malenkov and
then Vyacheslav Molotov in 1955.
By the beginning of 1956, Khrushchev was the first among equals
in the ruling Presidium. Yet a mere year and half later, he was
nearly ousted in an attempted Kremlin coup. His near-defeat
resulted from a variety of factors, of which the most important
were the consequences of Khrushchev's Secret Speech attacking
Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. This
speech, the content of which became widely known, sparked
turmoil in the USSR, a political upheaval in Poland, and a
revolution in Hungary, which Soviet troops crushed in November
1956. Khrushchev's aims in unmasking Stalin ranged from
compromising Stalinist colleagues to expiating his own sins. The
result of the speech, however, was to begin the process of
undermining the Soviet system while at the same time undermining
himself.
Khrushchev's opponents, primarily Malenkov, Molotov, and Lazar
Kaganovich, took advantage of the disarray to try to oust him in
June 1957. With their defeat, he might have been expected to
intensify his anti-Stalin campaign. Instead, his policies proved
contradictory, as if the tumultuous consequences of the Secret
Speech had taught Khrushchev that his own authority depended on
Stalin's not being totally discredited.
Even before Khrushchev was fully in charge, improving Soviet
agriculture had been perhaps his highest priority. In 1953 he
had endorsed long-needed reforms designed to increase
incentives: a reduction in taxes, an increase in procurement
prices paid by the state for obligatory collective farm
deliveries, and encouragement of individual peasant plots, which
produced much of the nation's vegetables and milk. By 1954,
however, he was pushing an ill-conceived crash program to
develop the so-called Virgin Lands of western Siberia and
Kazakhstan as a quick way to increase overall output. Another
example of Khrushchev's impulsiveness was his wildly unrealistic
1957 pledge to overtake the United States in the per capita
output of meat, butter, and milk in only a few years, a promise
that counted on a radical expansion of corn-growing even in
regions where that ultimately proved impossible to sustain.
That all these policies failed to set Soviet agriculture on the
path to sustained growth was visible in the disappointing
harvests of 1960 and 1962. These setbacks led Khrushchev to
raise retail prices for meat and poultry products in May 1962,
breaking with popular expectations. The move triggered riots,
including those in Novocherkassk, where nearly twenty-five
people were killed by troops brought in to quell the
disturbances. Khrushchev's next would-be panacea was his
November 1962 proposal to divide the Communist Party itself into
agricultural and industrial wings, a move that alienated party
officials while failing to improve the harvest, which was so bad
in 1963 that Moscow was forced to buy wheat overseas, including
from the United States.
The party split was the latest in a series of reorganizations
that characterized Khrushchev's approach to economic
administration. In 1957 he replaced many of the central Moscow
ministries that had been running the economy with regional
"councils of the national economy," a change that alienated the
former central ministers who were forced to relocate to the
provinces.
Housing and school reform were also on Khrushchev's agenda. To
address the dreadful urban housing shortage bequeathed by
Stalin, Khrushchev encouraged rapid, assembly-line construction
of standardized, prefabricated five-story apartment houses,
which proved to be a quick fix, but not a long-term solution.
Khrushchev's idea of school reform was to add a year to the
basic ten-year program, to be partly devoted to learning a
manual trade at a local factory or farm, an idea that reflected
his own training but met widespread resistance from parents,
teachers, and factory and farm directors loath to take on new
teenage charges.
The Thaw in Soviet culture began before Khrushchev's Secret
Speech but gained momentum from it. The cultural and scientific
intelligentsia was a natural constituency for a reformer like
Khrushchev, but he and his Kremlin colleagues feared the Thaw
might become a flood. His inconsistent actions alienated all
elements of the intelligentsia while deepening Khrushchev's own
love-hate feelings toward writers and artists. On the one hand,
he authorized the 1957 World Youth Festival, for which thousands
of young people from around the world flooded into Moscow. On
the other hand, he encouraged the fierce campaign against Boris
Pasternak after the poet and author of Dr. Zhivago was awarded
the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1958. The Twenty-second Party
Congress in October 1961, which was marked by an eruption of
anti-Stalinist rhetoric, seemed to recommit Khrushchev to an
alliance with liberal intellectuals, especially when followed by
the decision to authorize publication of Alexander
Solzhenitsyn's novel about the Gulag, One Day in the Life of
Ivan Denisovich, and Yevgeny Yevtushenko's poem "The Heirs of
Stalin." But after the Cuban missile crisis ended in defeat,
Khrushchev turned to chastising and browbeating the liberal
intelligentsia at a series of ugly confrontations in the winter
of 1962 and 1963.
As little as his minimal education prepared him to run the
internal affairs of a vast, transcontinental empire, it prepared
him even less for foreign policy. For the first fifty years of
his life he had little exposure to the outside world and almost
none to the great powers, and after Stalin's death, he initially
remained on the foreign policy sidelines. Even before defeating
the Anti-Party Group, however, he began to direct Soviet foreign
relations, and afterward it was almost entirely his to command.
Stalin's legacy in foreign affairs was abysmal: When he died,
the West was mobilizing against Moscow, and even allies (in
Eastern Europe and China) and neutrals had been alienated. All
Stalin's heirs sought to address these problems, but Khrushchev
did so most boldly and energetically.
To China Khrushchev offered extensive economic and technical
assistance of the sort for which Stalin had driven a hard
bargain, along with benevolent tutelage that he assumed Mao
would appreciate. Initially the Chinese were pleased, but
Khrushchev's failure to consult them before denouncing Stalin in
1956, his fumbling attempts to cope with the Polish and
Hungarian turmoil of the same year, and his requests for
military concessions in 1958 led to two acrimonious summit
meetings with Mao (in August 1958 and September 1959), after
which he precipitously withdrew Soviet technical experts from
China in 1960. The result was an open, apparently irrevocable
Sino-Soviet split.
Khrushchev tried to bring Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc,
the better to tie the Communist camp together by substituting
tolerance of diversity and domestic autonomy for Stalinist
terror. Khrushchev's trip to Belgrade in May 1955, undertaken
against the opposition of Molotov, gave him a stake in obtaining
Yugoslav President Tito's cooperation. But if Tito, too, was
eager for reconciliation, it was on his own terms, which
Khrushchev could not entirely accept. As with China, therefore,
Khrushchev's embrace of a would-be Communist ally ended not in
new harmony but in new stresses and strains.
Whereas Stalin had mostly ignored Third World countries, since
he had little interest in what he could not control, Khrushchev
set out to woo them as a way of undermining "Western
imperialism." In 1955 he and Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin
traveled to India, Burma, and Afghanistan. In 1960 he returned
to these three countries and visited Indonesia as well. He
backed the radical president of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, and
reached out to support Fidel Castro in Cuba. Yet, despite these
and other moves, Khrushchev also tried to ease Cold War tensions
with the West, and particularly with his main capitalist rival,
the United States. As Khrushchev saw it, he had opened up the
USSR to Western influences, abandoned the Stalinist notion that
world war was inevitable, made deep unilateral cuts in Soviet
armed forces, pulled Soviet troops out of Austria and Finland,
and encouraged reform in Eastern Europe.
The Berlin ultimatum that Khrushchev issued in November 1958 -
that if the West didn't recognize East Germany, Moscow would
give the German Communists control over access to West Berlin,
thus abrogating Western rights stipulated in postwar Potsdam
accords - was designed not only to ensure the survival of the
beleaguered German Democratic Republic, but to force the Western
allies into negotiations on a broad range of issues. And at
first the strategy worked. It secured Khrushchev an invitation
to the United States in September 1959, the first time a Soviet
leader had visited the United States, after which a four-power
summit was scheduled for Paris in May 1960. But in the end,
Khrushchev's talks with Eisenhower produced little progress, the
Paris summit collapsed when an American U-2 spy flight was shot
down on May 1, 1960, and his Vienna summit meeting with
President John F. Kennedy in June 1961 produced no progress
either. Instead of a German agreement, he had to settle for the
Berlin Wall which was constructed in August 1961.
By deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962,
Khrushchev aimed to protect Fidel Castro from an American
invasion, to rectify the strategic nuclear imbalance, which had
swung in America's favor, and just possibly to prepare the way
for one last diplomatic offensive on Berlin. After he was forced
ignominiously to remove those missiles, not only was
Khrushchev's foreign policy momentum spent, but his domestic
authority began to unravel. With so many of his domestic and
foreign policies at dead ends, with diverse groups ranging from
the military to the intelligentsia alienated, and with his own
energy and confidence running down, the way was open for his
colleagues, most of them his own appointees but by now
disillusioned with him, to conspire against him. In October
1964, in contrast to 1957, the plotters prepared carefully and
well. Led by Leonid Brezhnev, they confronted him with a united
opposition in the Presidium and the Central Committee, and
forced him to resign on grounds of age and health.
From 1964 to 1971 Khrushchev lived under de facto house arrest
outside Moscow. Almost entirely isolated, he at first became ill
and depressed. Later, he mustered the energy and determination
to dictate his memoirs; the first ever by a Soviet leader, they
also served as a harbinger of glasnost to come under Mikhail
Gorbachev. Called in by party authorities to account for the
Western publication of his memoirs, Khrushchev revealed the
depth not only of his anger at his colleagues-turned-tormentors,
but his deep sense of guilt at his complicity in Stalin's
crimes. By the very end of his life, to judge by a Kremlin
doctor's recollections, he was even losing faith in the cause of
socialism.
After his death, Khrushchev became a "non-person" in the USSR,
his name suppressed by his successors and ignored by most Soviet
citizens until the late 1980s, when his record received a burst
of attention in connection with Gorbachev's new round of reform.
Khrushchev's legacy, like his life, is remarkably mixed. Perhaps
his most long-lasting bequest is the way his efforts at
de-Stalinization, awkward and erratic though they were, prepared
the ground for the reform and then the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
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This web page was last updated on:
11 December, 2008
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